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“It Wasn’t Because of Human Rights:” Exploring the Limited Use of Landmines by Colombian Paramilitary Groups

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Journal Article (2024)

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 Investigates the reasons behind the limited use of landmines by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), despite their engagement in other forms of extreme violence.

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Garbino, Henrique. '“It Wasn’t Because of Human Rights:” Exploring the Limited Use of Landmines by Colombian Paramilitary Groups'. Acume. https://www.acume.org/r/it-wasnt-because-of-human-rights-exploring-the-limited-use-of-landmines-by-colombian-paramilitary-groups/
Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

The Colombian conflict, one of the longest-running and most complex in the world, involves various armed groups, drug cartels, and state forces. The conflict began in the mid-twentieth century with the rise of leftist guerrilla movements like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), which sought to overthrow the government and address inequality and land distribution issues. In response, right-wing paramilitary groups, notably the AUC, emerged to counter the guerrillas. Despite efforts at demobilization and peace agreements, remnants of these groups and new criminal organizations continue to perpetuate violence and instability in Colombia. The AUC, a coalition of over forty factions formed in 1997, initially aimed to protect civilian elites from guerrilla attacks, extortion, and kidnapping, and supported Colombian military and police counterinsurgency efforts. Over time, the AUC became involved in drug trafficking, established extortion networks, and engaged in local, regional, and national politics, a phenomenon known as parapolitica. Although formally illegal and operating independently from the Colombian government, the AUC was involved in collusion with Colombian security forces and military confrontations. Between 2003 and 2006, over 30,000 members of the paramilitary group were demobilized, with several remaining in illegal armed groups, known as neo-paramilitary groups. Most former combatants underwent reintegration, and several commanders were jailed in Colombia or extradited to the United States.

 

Key findings

  • The AUC's limited use of landmines is primarily attributed to their low tactical utility.
    Evidence

    Official government sources state that about 45% of all landmines in Colombia were laid by the FARC-EP, 25% by the ELN, and only 1% by the AUC. Interviews and legal archives provide minimal evidence of landmine use by the AUC, with former OAS disarmament and demobilization monitors confirming that the AUC returned few landmines.

    What it means

    The AUC's decision not to use landmines was influenced by their lack of clear tactical purpose, relative symmetry (and sometimes superiority) in fighting power over guerrilla groups, and urban organization, which reduced the need for landmines.

  • The inherent costs of landmine use deterred the AUC from employing them.
    Evidence

    The AUC had access to explosives and technical expertise, with about a quarter of its factions using explosive devices for intimidation, property destruction, and murder. However, the risks of accidental detonations during manufacture and emplacement, as well as the high costs of treating and rehabilitating landmine survivors, were significant deterrents.

    What it means

    The logistical and coordination costs, along with the risks of accidental detonations, made landmine use less appealing to the AUC, despite their access to resources and expertise.

  • Normative biases against landmine use existed within the AUC.
    Evidence

    The AUC's internal statutes declared a commitment to International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, prohibiting activities resembling those carried out by the enemy, such as landmine use. Interviews with former combatants revealed that landmine use was stigmatized as ''terrorism,'' associated with the extreme left in Colombia.

    What it means

    The AUC's normative biases, rooted in their self-defense origins and internal statutes, contributed to their restraint in using landmines, despite their engagement in other forms of extreme violence.

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“It Wasn’t Because of Human Rights:” Exploring the Limited Use of Landmines by Colombian Paramilitary Groups

Cite this brief: Garbino, Henrique. '“It Wasn’t Because of Human Rights:” Exploring the Limited Use of Landmines by Colombian Paramilitary Groups'. Acume. https://www.acume.org/r/it-wasnt-because-of-human-rights-exploring-the-limited-use-of-landmines-by-colombian-paramilitary-groups/

Brief created by: Henrique Garbino | Year brief made: 2025

Original research:

  • Garbino, H., ‘It Wasn’t Because of Human Rights:” Exploring the Limited Use of Landmines by Colombian Paramilitary Groups’, pp. {“valid”:true,”reason”:”empty–ok”} https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2024.2398330. – https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2024.2398330

Research brief:

Investigates the reasons behind the limited use of landmines by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), despite their engagement in other forms of extreme violence.

The Colombian conflict, one of the longest-running and most complex in the world, involves various armed groups, drug cartels, and state forces. The conflict began in the mid-twentieth century with the rise of leftist guerrilla movements like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), which sought to overthrow the government and address inequality and land distribution issues. In response, right-wing paramilitary groups, notably the AUC, emerged to counter the guerrillas. Despite efforts at demobilization and peace agreements, remnants of these groups and new criminal organizations continue to perpetuate violence and instability in Colombia. The AUC, a coalition of over forty factions formed in 1997, initially aimed to protect civilian elites from guerrilla attacks, extortion, and kidnapping, and supported Colombian military and police counterinsurgency efforts. Over time, the AUC became involved in drug trafficking, established extortion networks, and engaged in local, regional, and national politics, a phenomenon known as parapolitica. Although formally illegal and operating independently from the Colombian government, the AUC was involved in collusion with Colombian security forces and military confrontations. Between 2003 and 2006, over 30,000 members of the paramilitary group were demobilized, with several remaining in illegal armed groups, known as neo-paramilitary groups. Most former combatants underwent reintegration, and several commanders were jailed in Colombia or extradited to the United States.

Findings:

The AUC’s limited use of landmines is primarily attributed to their low tactical utility.

Official government sources state that about 45% of all landmines in Colombia were laid by the FARC-EP, 25% by the ELN, and only 1% by the AUC. Interviews and legal archives provide minimal evidence of landmine use by the AUC, with former OAS disarmament and demobilization monitors confirming that the AUC returned few landmines.

The AUC’s decision not to use landmines was influenced by their lack of clear tactical purpose, relative symmetry (and sometimes superiority) in fighting power over guerrilla groups, and urban organization, which reduced the need for landmines.

The inherent costs of landmine use deterred the AUC from employing them.

The AUC had access to explosives and technical expertise, with about a quarter of its factions using explosive devices for intimidation, property destruction, and murder. However, the risks of accidental detonations during manufacture and emplacement, as well as the high costs of treating and rehabilitating landmine survivors, were significant deterrents.

The logistical and coordination costs, along with the risks of accidental detonations, made landmine use less appealing to the AUC, despite their access to resources and expertise.

Normative biases against landmine use existed within the AUC.

The AUC’s internal statutes declared a commitment to International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, prohibiting activities resembling those carried out by the enemy, such as landmine use. Interviews with former combatants revealed that landmine use was stigmatized as ”terrorism,” associated with the extreme left in Colombia.

The AUC’s normative biases, rooted in their self-defense origins and internal statutes, contributed to their restraint in using landmines, despite their engagement in other forms of extreme violence.

14098
|
2024

""It Wasn’t Because of Human Rights:” Exploring the Limited Use of Landmines by Colombian Paramilitary Groups"

Cite paper

Garbino, H., ‘It Wasn’t Because of Human Rights:” Exploring the Limited Use of Landmines by Colombian Paramilitary Groups’, pp. {“valid”:true,”reason”:”empty–ok”} https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2024.2398330.

Published in Studies In Conflict & Terrorism, pp. {"valid":true,"reason":"empty-ok"}.
Peer Reviewed

DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2024.2398330
🔗 Find full paper (Not open access)
Methodology
This is a qualitative research.
archival research

This study used a combination of congruence analysis and comparative methods to assess the limited use of landmines by the AUC. Data was collected through semi-structured interviews with 48 individuals, including former combatants, military and police personnel, government officials, UN and OAS officials, NGO staff, and scholars. Additionally, the study reviewed over 300 documents from the transitional justice process known as Justicia y Paz, as well as primary and secondary sources on the Colombian conflict. The research accounted for potential biases in government sources and ensured a comprehensive understanding of the AUC's decision-making processes.



Funding

This study was funded by Forskraftstiftelsen Theodor Adelswärds minne.

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